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BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Plaintiffs Bellevue Drug Co., Robert Schreiber, Inc., 
and Rehn-Heurbinger Drug Co. (collectively “Plaintiffs”) 
appeal the District Court’s order granting Defendant 
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AdvancePCS’s motion to compel arbitration.  Plaintiffs argue 
that the District Court erred in ordering them to arbitrate their 
antitrust claims because: (1) AdvancePCS waived its right to 
arbitrate by actively litigating the case in federal court for 
more than ten months prior to demanding arbitration; and (2) 
the arbitration clause is unenforceable because it limits the 
remedies that Plaintiffs can receive under the Sherman Act, 
and contains a fee-shifting provision that deters Plaintiffs 
from proceeding in arbitration.  Because we agree with 
Plaintiffs that AdvancePCS waived its right to arbitrate, we 
will reverse the order of the District Court compelling 
arbitration, and need not reach those issues addressed to the 
clause itself.  
 
I.  Background 
 The factual and procedural background underlying this 
case was extensively summarized in this Court’s precedential 
decision disposing of an earlier appeal, In re Pharmacy 
Benefit Managers Antitrust Litigation, 582 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 
2009).  We will not reprise the entire background here, but 
will set forth those facts necessary to our analysis of the 
waiver issue, and most particularly those facts preceding 
AdvancePCS’s motion to compel arbitration.   
 
 AdvancePCS is a prescription benefits manager 
(“PBM”) for drug benefit plans sponsored by employers, 
unions, government agencies, insurance plans and others 
(“Plan Sponsors”).  PBMs are retained by Plan Sponsors to 
efficiently manage their benefit plans and to achieve cost 
savings for Plan Sponsors and plan members.  PBMs achieve 
efficiencies and cost savings in a variety of ways, including 
negotiating discounts or rebates from drug manufacturers, 
providing mail order prescription service to plan members, 
contracting with retail pharmacies for reimbursement when 
prescriptions are filled for plan members, and electronic 
processing and paying of claims.   
 
 Plaintiffs are retail pharmacy businesses that entered 
into written Pharmacy Provider Agreements (“the 
Agreements” or “PPA”) with AdvancePCS to provide 
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prescription drugs and related pharmacy services to persons 
covered by drug benefit plans administered by AdvancePCS.  
The PPA establishes the terms and conditions under which the 
Plaintiffs were to provide prescription drugs and services to 
plan members, and sets forth an agreed reimbursement rate 
that AdvancePCS will pay to the pharmacies.  The PPA also 
contains an arbitration clause which provides:   
 
Arbitration.  Any and all controversies in 
connection with or arising out of this 
Agreement will be exclusively settled by 
arbitration before a single arbitrator in 
accordance with the Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association.  The arbitrator must 
follow the rule of law, and may only award 
remedies provided in this Agreement.  The 
award of the arbitrator will be final and binding 
on the parties, and judgment upon such award 
may be entered in any court having jurisdiction 
thereof.  Arbitration under this provision will be 
conducted in Scottsdale, Arizona, and Provider 
hereby agrees to such jurisdiction, unless 
otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing or 
mandated by Law, and the expenses of the 
arbitration, including attorneys’ fees, will be 
paid by the party against whom the award of the 
arbitrator is rendered.  This Section 9.5 and the 
parties’ rights hereunder shall be governed by 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et 
seq. 
 
(App. 381-82.)  The PPA also includes a severability clause, 
which provides:   
 
Lawful Interpretation.  Whenever possible, 
each provision of this Agreement will be 
interpreted so as to be effective and valid under 
applicable Law, but if any provision of this 
Agreement should be rendered unenforceable or 
invalid under applicable Law, that provision 
will be ineffective to the extent of such 
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unenforceability or invalidity without 
invalidating the remaining provisions of this 
Agreement.  
 
(App. 381.)  
 
On August 15, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a putative class 
action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and all other similarly-
situated pharmacies that contracted with AdvancePCS to sell 
drugs for a prescription drug benefit plan.  The complaint 
asserted an antitrust claim against AdvancePCS, alleging that 
it had engaged in an unlawful conspiracy with its Plan 
Sponsors to restrain competition in violation of the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.  In particular, Plaintiffs alleged that 
AdvancePCS used the combined economic power of its Plan 
Sponsors to reduce the contractual amount it pays to retail 
pharmacies below the levels that would prevail in a 
competitive marketplace.  Plaintiffs also alleged that the 
Agreements impose certain limitations on drug refills and co-
payment charges to plan members.  The complaint sought 
treble damages, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, and costs.  
The case was initially assigned to Judge Eduardo C. Robreno.    
 
 As noted at the outset, for more than ten months 
following the filing of the complaint, AdvancePCS actively—
and, indeed, aggressively—litigated the case without 
mentioning arbitration, much less filing a motion to compel 
arbitration.  On September 25, 2003, more than a month after 
the complaint was filed, AdvancePCS filed a nineteen-page 
motion to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiffs suffered no antitrust injury, 
failed to allege a per se price-fixing agreement, and failed to 
allege any rule of reason price-fixing agreement.  With the 
motion, AdvancePCS submitted a binder of allegedly 
judicially-noticeable exhibits—as “thick as the yellow pages,” 
we are told, including three lengthy government-sponsored 
studies of the efficiency enhancing effects of PBMs, as well 
as AdvancePCS’s own annual report to the SEC (Form 10-K), 
and other materials.  Plaintiffs submitted a thirty-one page 
response brief, and AdvancePCS filed a seventeen-page reply 
brief, expanding upon its earlier presentation as it argued that 
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no antitrust injury had been alleged; that no per se price-
fixing agreement had been alleged because the complaint 
lacked allegations of horizontal conspiracy, monopsony 
power, and supra-competitive output pricing; that Plaintiffs 
incorrectly interpreted materials of the U. S. Department of 
Justice and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”); that price-
fixing agreements by sellers should be treated differently; that 
Plaintiffs’ authorities on monopsony power were inadequate; 
that buyer cartel cases were inapposite; and that the complaint 
failed to state a rule of reason antitrust violation.   
 
 On February 5, 2004, Judge Robreno held a hearing on 
the motion to dismiss, and on March 2, 2004, denied the 
motion in a detailed sixteen-page opinion, rejecting each of 
AdvancePCS’s substantive antitrust arguments—Plaintiffs, 
the Court concluded, had standing and had alleged facts 
sufficient to state an antitrust claim.  Two weeks later, on 
March 16, 2004, AdvancePCS filed a twelve-page motion to 
reconsider the denial of its motion to dismiss, or to certify it 
for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  The 
motion to reconsider again urged dismissal based on the 
results of a recent FTC investigation into the acquisition of 
AdvancePCS by Caremark, Inc.  Plaintiffs filed a fifteen-page 
response brief, and AdvancePCS replied.   
 
 At the same time in March 2004 as it filed its motion 
for reconsideration, AdvancePCS filed an answer to the 
complaint, and asserted a host of affirmative defenses, 
including failure to state a claim, lack of standing, lack of 
antitrust injury, laches, estoppel, waiver, failure to mitigate, 
failure to plead with particularity, and failure to join necessary 
and indispensable parties.  On April 20, 2004, new counsel 
for AdvancePCS entered their appearances.  A hearing was 
subsequently held on the motion for reconsideration, and on 
May 14, 2004, the motion was denied.  Also on May 14, 
2004, Judge Robreno ordered the parties to submit a 
discovery plan and a proposed case management order, and 
scheduled a pretrial conference for June 15, 2004.  On 
consent, the conference was rescheduled to July 6, 2004.   
 
 Five weeks after Judge Robreno’s latest order, and 
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after more than ten months of active and wholly unsuccessful 
litigation, on June 21, 2004, AdvancePCS filed a motion to 
compel arbitration asking the District Court, for the first time, 
to enforce the arbitration clause in the PPA and enter an order 
compelling arbitration of the case.  Plaintiffs opposed the 
motion, arguing that AdvancePCS waived any right to 
arbitrate by actively litigating the case in federal court for as 
long as it did, and that the arbitration agreement was 
unenforceable for various reasons.  
 
On August 24, 2004, Judge Robreno granted the 
motion to compel arbitration and stayed the District Court 
action.  He concluded that Plaintiffs had entered into 
enforceable arbitration agreements that encompassed the 
antitrust claims, and that AdvancePCS had not waived its 
right to seek arbitration.  Plaintiffs filed a motion for 
reconsideration or, in the alternative, for certification of an 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  Judge 
Robreno denied reconsideration and certification, and ordered 
that the case remain stayed in accordance with the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  
 
Plaintiffs, however, did not thereafter initiate 
arbitration proceedings.  Rather, on May 19, 2006, Plaintiffs 
filed a motion to lift the stay and dismiss the complaint.  In 
the motion, Plaintiffs represented that they did not intend to 
arbitrate their claims, and instead wished to dismiss the 
complaint so that they could pursue an appeal of the decision 
to compel arbitration.  While this motion was pending, the 
case was transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation to Judge John P. Fullam for consolidated pretrial 
proceedings with five other similar antitrust actions against 
PBMs.   
  
On December 7, 2006, Judge Fullam convened a status 
conference in the MDL proceedings and heard argument on 
the motion to lift the stay and dismiss the complaint.  
Following the conference, Judge Fullam sua sponte issued an 
order vacating Judge Robreno’s order compelling arbitration, 
concluding that “the parties never intended this type of 
litigation to be submitted to arbitration,” and “that the 
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Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable because it violates 
public policy.” (App. 309.)  Judge Fullam thus denied as moot 
the Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss their complaint to seek 
appellate review.   
 
AdvancePCS filed an immediate appeal to this Court 
pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A) & (B).  Concluding that 
Judge Fullam’s order violated the law of the case doctrine, we 
vacated that order, and remanded with directions to reinstate 
Judge Robreno’s order compelling arbitration.   
 
On November 5, 2009, following remand, Plaintiffs 
renewed their motion to dismiss their complaint to permit an 
immediate appeal of Judge Robreno’s reinstated order 
compelling arbitration.  While this motion was pending, the 
case was reassigned to Judge C. Darnell Jones.  The parties 
were ordered to submit supplemental briefs, and oral 
argument was held.  On January 27, 2012, Judge Jones 
granted Plaintiffs’ motion and dismissed their claims with 
prejudice.  Plaintiffs appealed.      
 
II.  Jurisdiction 
 AdvancePCS questions our jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal.  Under the FAA, a party may generally not appeal 
from an interlocutory order “compelling arbitration” or 
“granting a stay” pending arbitration.  9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1) & 
(b)(3).  Thus, Judge Robreno’s order compelling arbitration 
was, at least initially, non-reviewable.  In an effort to 
circumvent the nonappealabilty of Judge Robreno’s order, 
Plaintiffs sought several times, and eventually obtained, an 
order lifting the stay and dismissing their complaint with 
prejudice.   
 
The FAA provides that an “appeal may be taken from  
. . . a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is 
subject to this title.”  Id. § 16(a)(3).  Where a district court 
compels arbitration and dismisses the federal lawsuit (rather 
than staying it), the Supreme Court has held that is a “final 
decision with respect to an arbitration,” and an appeal may 
then be taken challenging the order compelling arbitration.  
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Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 
(2000).  This is true whether the dismissal of the case is with 
or without prejudice.  Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 
595, 600-02 (3d Cir. 2002).  The Supreme Court reasoned that 
the phrase “final decision with respect to an arbitration” has 
the same meaning as “final decision” in other contexts, and 
refers to a decision that “‘ends the litigation on the merits and 
leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the 
judgment.’”  Randolph, 531 U.S. at 86 (quoting Digital 
Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 
(1994) and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 
(1978)).  The “judgment” to be executed upon is not the 
underlying complaint, but a “new” and “separate” proceeding 
in the District Court to enter judgment on the arbitration 
award or vacate or modify that award.   
 
AdvancePCS attempts to distinguish Randolph and 
Blair, arguing that those cases involved involuntary 
dismissals of the plaintiffs’ claims simultaneous with the 
order compelling arbitration, whereas Plaintiffs sought a 
voluntary dismissal of their complaint after the fact.  
AdvancePCS contends that Plaintiffs are thus seeking an “end 
run” around the nonappealability of Judge Robreno’s order.  
If Judge Robreno  had dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims at the same 
time he compelled arbitration, there would be no doubt as to 
our jurisdiction under Randolph and Blair.   
 
In essence, though, Judge Jones’ dismissal order 
modified Judge Robreno’s order by substituting a dismissal 
for the stay, thus putting Plaintiffs in a functionally-identical 
position to the plaintiffs in Randolph and Blair.  Just as in 
those cases, the ultimate dismissal was an order that ended the 
litigation on the merits and left nothing more for the District 
Court to do but execute the judgment.  It is thus a “final 
decision with respect to an arbitration” within the meaning of 
9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3).  The fact that Plaintiffs obtained the 
dismissal in a different manner is irrelevant because, as we 
have noted, “[t]he [Randolph] decision draws a distinction 
between dismissals and stays, but does not draw any 
distinctions within the universe of dismissals.”  Blair, 283 
F.3d at 602.  Accordingly, we have subject matter jurisdiction.   
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III.  Discussion   
 Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to counteract “the 
traditional judicial hostility to the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.”  Alexander v. Anthony Intern., L.P., 341 F.3d 
256, 263 (3d Cir. 2003).  “Under the FAA, such agreements 
are enforceable to the same extent as other contracts.”  Parilla 
v. IAP Worldwide Servs., VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).  There is a strong 
federal policy in favor of arbitration, and a “party to a valid 
and enforceable arbitration agreement is entitled to a stay of 
federal court proceedings pending arbitration as well as an 
order compelling such arbitration.”  Alexander, 341 F.3d at 
263; see also Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 
U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (noting that “the Court has also long 
recognized and enforced a liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements”).  When a federal court addresses a 
motion to compel arbitration, it is “limited to a narrow scope 
of inquiry.” Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 386 (3d Cir. 
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court may 
consider only narrow “gateway matters” that touch on the 
question of arbitrability, such as whether an arbitration 
agreement applies to a particular controversy, or whether the 
parties are bound by the arbitration clause.  Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 
489 F.3d 580, 585 (3d Cir. 2007).  “Thus, only when there is a 
question regarding whether the parties should be arbitrating at 
all is a question of arbitrability raised for the court to resolve.  
In other circumstances, resolution by the arbitrator remains 
the presumptive rule.”  Id. (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted).   
 
Plaintiffs concede that the PPA contains a broadly-
worded arbitration clause that applies to “[a]ny and all 
controversies in connection with or arising out of th[e] 
Agreement.”  Moreover, Plaintiffs do not seriously dispute 
that their antitrust claim against AdvancePCS is a controversy 
arising out of the PPA and thus falls within the scope of the 
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arbitration clause.1
 
  Rather, Plaintiffs argue that Judge 
Robreno incorrectly decided several questions of arbitrability 
and erred in granting the motion to compel arbitration 
because: (1) AdvancePCS waived its right to arbitrate; and (2) 
the arbitration clause is unenforceable.  As noted above, we 
agree on the waiver issue and thus do not reach the issue of 
enforceability.       
 Plaintiffs’ primary argument on appeal is that Judge 
Robreno erred in compelling arbitration because AdvancePCS 
waived its right to arbitrate by actively litigating the case in 
federal court for more than ten months while remaining silent 
about arbitration.  Judge Robreno concluded that the issue of 
waiver was for the arbitrator (not the Court) to decide and 
that, in any case, Plaintiffs had failed to show prejudice 
resulting from AdvancePCS’s delay in asserting the 
arbitration clause.  We exercise plenary review over the 
question of “whether a party through its litigation conduct, 
waived its right to compel arbitration.”  Gray Holdco, Inc. v. 
Cassady, 654 F.3d 444, 451 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  To the extent that a district court makes 
factual findings in making this determination, we review its 
findings for clear error.  Id.      
 
 At the time Judge Robreno issued his order compelling 
arbitration, the law was unclear as to whether waiver was an 
issue that should be decided by the district court or the 
arbitrator.  Several years after that order, however, we made 
clear that “waiver of the right to arbitrate based on litigation 
conduct remains presumptively an issue for the court to 
decide.”  Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 
221 (3d Cir. 2007).  The only question, then, is whether Judge 
                                                 
1 Plaintiffs do argue that “[t]he express terms of the 
[arbitration] clause demonstrate that the parties did not intend 
to arbitrate antitrust claims.”  (Appellants’ Br. at 48.)  To the 
extent this is intended as an argument that the antitrust claims 
do not fall within the plain language of the arbitration clause, 
that argument has been waived because it was not raised 
before the District Court.  (App. 120-46, arguing only waiver 
& unenforceability).   
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Robreno erred in finding that Plaintiffs had failed to establish 
waiver.    
 
 A. Legal Standard for Assessing Waiver 
 “‘Consistent with the strong preference for arbitration 
in federal courts, waiver is not to be lightly inferred,’” and 
“‘will normally be found only where the demand for 
arbitration came long after the suit commenced and when 
both parties had engaged in extensive discovery.’”  Nino v. 
Jewelry Exch., Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 208 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting PaineWebber Inc. v. Faragalli, 61 F.3d 1063, 1068-
69 (3d Cir. 1995)).  A court may, however, refuse to enforce 
an arbitration agreement where a “party has acted 
inconsistently with the right to arbitrate, and we will not 
hesitate to hold that the right to arbitrate has been waived 
where a sufficient showing of prejudice has been made by the 
party seeking to avoid arbitration.”  Id. (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).       
 
  “[P]rejudice is the touchstone for determining whether 
the right to arbitrate has been waived by litigation conduct.”  
Zimmer v. CooperNeff Advisors, Inc., 523 F.3d 224, 231 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).  To aid the 
analysis of waiver questions, we have “identified six 
nonexclusive factors to guide the prejudice inquiry:” 
 
(1) timeliness or lack thereof of the motion to 
arbitrate; (2) extent to which the party seeking 
arbitration has contested the merits of the 
opposing party’s claims; (3) whether the party 
seeking arbitration informed its adversary of its 
intent to pursue arbitration prior to seeking to 
enjoin the court proceedings; (4) the extent to 
which a party seeking arbitration engaged in 
non-merits motion practice; (5) the party’s 
acquiescence to the court’s pretrial orders; and 
(6) the extent to which the parties have engaged 
in discovery.    
 
Gray Holdco, 654 F.3d at 451 (citing Hoxworth v. Blinder, 
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Robinson & Co., Inc., 980 F.2d 912, 926-27 (3d Cir. 1992)).  
These are known as the Hoxworth factors, and they are 
“generally . . . indicative of whether a party opposing 
arbitration would suffer prejudice attributable to the other 
party’s delay in seeking arbitration.”  Id.  The factors, 
however, are “nonexclusive” and “not all the factors need be 
present to justify a finding of waiver.”  Nino, 609 F.3d at 209.  
Rather, “the waiver determination must be based on the 
circumstances and context of the particular case.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).    
 
 B. Application of the Hoxworth Factors 
 This first Hoxworth factor to consider is the timeliness 
of the motion to arbitrate.  In this case, AdvancePCS filed its 
motion to compel arbitration on June 21, 2004, over ten 
months after Plaintiffs filed their complaint in federal court.  
A ten month delay is significantly longer than the cases in 
which we have found no waiver, see Palcko v. Airborne 
Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 598 (3d Cir. 2004) (38 days); 
PaineWebber, 61 F.3d at 1069 (two months); Wood v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 207 F.3d 674, 680 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(one-and-a-half months); Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell 
Co., 526 F.2d 777, 783–84 (3d Cir. 1975) (arbitration motion 
made “immediately” after removing case to federal court), 
and sits at the low end of the cases in which we have found 
waiver, see Gray Holdco, 654 F.3d at 454 (ten months); 
Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 925 (11 months); Nino, 609 F.3d at 
210 (15 months); Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 223 (4 years).  
Furthermore, AdvancePCS has not offered any satisfactory 
explanation for its delay in asserting arbitration other than the 
fact that the motion was made (more than two months, we 
note) after it retained new counsel.  Gray Holdco, 654 F.3d at 
454 (finding significant that the party offered no explanation 
for its ten month delay).  Therefore, this factor weighs in 
favor of finding waiver.     
 
 The second Hoxworth factor is the extent to which the 
party seeking arbitration has contested the merits of the 
opposing party’s claims.  In this case, prior to seeking 
arbitration, AdvancePCS filed thirty-eight pages of briefing 
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on its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim—a motion 
which directly addressed the merits of Plaintiffs antitrust 
claims—and supported that briefing with a binder of materials 
and studies.  After a hearing was held and the motion to 
dismiss was denied, AdvancePCS next filed a twelve-page 
motion for reconsideration, essentially re-urging dismissal 
based on the results of a recent FTC investigation.  After 
holding a second hearing, the District Court denied the 
motion.   
 
 In sum, AdvancePCS directly contested the merits of 
Plaintiffs’ case through what was, in essence, two motions to 
dismiss, with ample briefing and supporting documentation, 
and raised issues outside of the scope of the pleadings.  This 
is significantly more activity on the merits than in cases in 
which we found no waiver, see Palcko, 372 F.3d at 598 
(motion to dismiss but only for insufficient service of 
process); PaineWebber, 61 F.3d at 1069 (no briefing on the 
merits); Wood, 207 F.3d at 680 (a motion to dismiss); Gavlik, 
526 F.2d at 783-84 (no contest on the merits), and appears to 
be at least comparable to (or stronger than) the cases in which 
we have found waiver, see Nino, 609 F.3d at 210-11 (no 
motions on the merits); Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 223 (motion for 
summary judgment); Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 925-26 (motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and opposition to 
motion for class certification); Gray Holdco, 654 F.3d at 456 
(motion for preliminary injunction with evidentiary hearing, 
and opposition to motions to dismiss).  This factor thus 
weighs in favor of finding waiver.   
 
The third factor is whether the party seeking arbitration 
informed its adversary of its intent to pursue arbitration prior 
to filing the motion to compel.  Here, AdvancePCS gave no 
prior indication to Plaintiffs of its intent to arbitrate, and 
arbitration was not raised as a defense in its answer to the 
complaint or elsewhere.  The facts of this case are thus 
stronger than the cases in which we have found no waiver, see 
Palcko, 372 F.3d at 598 (requested arbitration from opposing 
party before filing motion to compel); PaineWebber, 61 F.3d 
at 1065 (objected that claims were subject to arbitration 21 
days after the filing of the plaintiff’s state court complaint); 
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Wood, 207 F.3d at 680 (raised arbitration in joint discovery 
plan before bringing motion to compel), and are comparable 
to or stronger than the cases in which we have found waiver, 
see Nino, 609 F.3d at 211 (included mandatory arbitration as 
one of ten affirmative defenses in its answer); Ehleiter, 482 
F.3d at 210-11 (no advanced notice); Gray Holdco, 654 F.3d 
at 457 (no advanced notice).  This factor, too, weighs in favor 
of finding waiver.    
 
 The fourth Hoxworth factor is the extent to which the 
party seeking arbitration engaged in non-merits motion 
practice.  AdvancePCS’s non-merits motions dealt mostly 
with administrative and scheduling matters, such as motions 
for admission pro hac vice, for leave to file a reply brief, and 
to continue the pretrial conference.  These motions were not 
contested.  In addition, however, AdvancePCS also filed 
(together with its motion for reconsideration) a motion for 
certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b) seeking immediate appellate relief that likely would 
not have been available to it in the arbitral forum.  These facts 
are stronger than the facts in those cases in which we have 
found no waiver, see Palcko, 372 F.3d at 598 (no non-merits 
motions mentioned); Wood, 207 F.3d at 680 (same); Gavlik, 
526 F.2d at 783-84 (same); but see PaineWebber, 61 F.3d at 
1069 (motion to dismiss non pros, i.e., for lack of 
prosecution), and sit near the low end of what we have found 
to support waiver in the past, see Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 223 
(motion to implead third party).  Admittedly, however, the 
cases in which we have found waiver have tended to have 
somewhat more significant non-merits motion practice.  See 
Nino, 609 F.3d at 212 (opposed three motions to compel 
discovery); Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 925-26 (filed motions to 
disqualify counsel and stay discovery, and opposed motions to 
compel discovery).  In any event, this factor is not an absolute 
requirement, and we have found waiver even where no 
significant non-merits motion practice occurred.  See Gray 
Holdco, 654 F.3d at 456.  Ultimately, however, this factor 
weighs slightly in favor of waiver or is (at worst) neutral.   
 
 The fifth factor is the party’s acquiescence in a court’s 
pretrial orders.  Judge Robreno entered orders setting hearings 
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on AdvancePCS’s motion to dismiss and motion for 
reconsideration.  AdvancePCS attended and participated in 
these hearings.  It also entered orders setting dates for the 
pretrial conference, and instructing the parties to submit a 
discovery plan and proposed case management order.  Prior to 
filing its motion to compel arbitration, AdvancePCS did not 
object to any of these orders.  Cases in which we have found 
no waiver generally were not litigated long enough to feature 
any acquiescence in pretrial orders, see PaineWebber, 61 F.3d 
at 1065; Gavlik, 526 F.2d at 783–84; but see Wood, 207 F.3d 
at 680 (filed a joint discovery plan), and AdvancePCS’s 
actions in this case are at the low end of the level of 
acquiescence that has supported waiver in our other 
precedents, see Gray Holdco, 654 F.3d at 459-60 (attended 
three status conferences and a court-ordered mediation 
without objection, and filed a Rule 26(f) report); Hoxworth, 
980 F.2d at 925 (participated in “numerous” pretrial 
proceedings); Nino, 609 F.3d at 212 (participated in ten 
pretrial conferences); Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 223 (“scrupulously 
assented” to the trial court’s orders, certified readiness for 
trial, and later sought a continuance and proposed new trial 
dates).  Thus, this factor weighs somewhat in favor of waiver.   
 
 The sixth and final factor is the extent to which the 
parties have engaged in discovery.  Plaintiffs concede that no 
discovery took place, which is identical to those cases in 
which no waiver was found. See Palcko, 372 F.3d at 598; 
PaineWebber, 61 F.3d at 1069; Wood, 207 F.3d at 680; 
Gavlik, 526 F.2d at 784.  Our cases finding waiver have 
uniformly featured significant discovery activity in the district 
court.  See Nino, 609 F.3d at 213 (parties engaged in 
“significant discovery,” including interrogatories, disclosures, 
requests for production and depositions of four witnesses, as 
well as “significant discovery related motion practice”); 
Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 224 (parties engaged in “extensive 
discovery,” exchanging several sets of interrogatories, 
production requests, and expert reports, and deposing 
“numerous witnesses”); Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 925-26 
(parties engaged in several depositions, answered several 
discovery requests, and litigated discovery disputes); Gray 
Holdco, 654 F.3d at 460 (parties engaged in discovery related 
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to a preliminary injunction hearing, including eight 
depositions, extensive written discovery responses, and the 
exchange of over 20,000 pages of documents).  Therefore, 
this factor cuts significantly against a finding of waiver.    
 
 On the whole, there is significantly more to support 
waiver here than in our cases in which the argument was 
rejected, but less overall to support waiver than in those cases 
in which waiver was found.  In rejecting Plaintiffs’ waiver 
argument, Judge Robreno relied heavily on the fact that no 
discovery had taken place.  It is true that we have arguably 
placed special emphasis on this factor in the past.  See, e.g., 
PaineWebber, 61 F.3d at 1068-69 (stating that “waiver will 
normally be found only where the demand for arbitration 
came long after the suit commenced and when both parties 
had engaged in extensive discovery”).  We have also 
repeatedly stated, however, that the Hoxworth factors are 
nonexclusive, and no one factor is determinative of the 
prejudice inquiry.  See, e.g., Nino, 609 F.3d at 209 (“As is 
evident by our repeated characterization of these factors as a 
nonexclusive list, not all the factors need be present to justify 
a finding of waiver . . . .”).  Indeed, our sister circuits have 
found waiver even in cases where no discovery has taken 
place.2
                                                 
2 Plaintiffs cite South Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Medquist, Inc., 
258 F. App’x. 466, 468 (3d Cir. 2007), noting that the fact 
that the parties did not engage in discovery normally 
precludes a finding of waiver, but here it is outweighed by 
AdvancePCS’s tactical decision to litigate extensively in 
federal court, including two motions to dismiss, before 
seeking to compel arbitration.  Under our Internal Operating 
Procedures, we do not cite to our not precedential opinions, 
and do not do so here.   
  See, e.g., La. Stadium & Exposition Dist. v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 626 F.3d 156, 159 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (noting that “[n]o discovery took place” in the 
eleven months before arbitration was sought, “but the 
litigation was hardly dormant”); Khan v. Parsons Global 
Servs., Ltd., 521 F.3d 421, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that 
the defendant’s non-pursuit of discovery was not dispositive, 
especially where discovery would likely focus on matters in 
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the defendant’s possession and control). 
 
 Moreover, Judge Robreno gave little weight to 
AdvancePCS’s motion to dismiss the case (and motion for 
reconsideration), concluding that “the Court’s ruling on [those 
motions] dealt only with pleading issues of law placing the 
parties back at the starting gate of the litigation.”  Thus, he 
reasoned that “the case stands essentially as it did ten months 
ago, i.e., with the pleadings now completed and the matter 
ready to proceed to discovery.”  While he may be correct that 
Plaintiffs’ legal position was not compromised as a result of 
AdvancePCS’s motions, in the years since that 2004 ruling we 
have reiterated that the prejudice needed to show waiver need 
not necessarily be “‘substantive prejudice to the legal position 
of the party claiming waiver,’ but also extends to ‘prejudice 
resulting from the unnecessary delay and expense incurred by 
the plaintiffs as a result of the defendants’ belated invocation 
of their right to arbitrate.’”  Nino, 609 F.3d at 209 (quoting 
Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 224).  For example, we have stated that:  
 
‘[W]here a party fails to demand arbitration 
during pretrial proceedings, and, in the 
meantime, engages in pretrial activity 
inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, the party 
later opposing . . . arbitration may more easily 
show that its position has been compromised, 
i.e., prejudiced,’ because under these 
circumstances we can readily infer that the party 
claiming waiver has already invested 
considerable time and expense in litigating the 
case in court, and would be required to 
duplicate its efforts, to at least some degree, if 
the case were now to proceed in the arbitral 
forum.  Prejudice of this sort is not mitigated by 
the absence of substantive prejudice to the legal 
position of the party claiming waiver. 
 
Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 224 (quoting Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 
926).  “In other words, the investment of considerable time 
and money litigating a case may amount to sufficient 
prejudice to bar a later-asserted right to arbitrate.” Nino, 609 
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F.3d at 209.  This is because arbitration is meant to streamline 
proceedings, reduce costs, and conserve resources, and none 
of these purposes are served “when a party actively litigates a 
case for an extended period only to belatedly assert that the 
dispute should have been arbitrated, not litigated, in the first 
place.”  Id.  Thus, the mere fact that the motions to dismiss 
merely placed the parties “back at the starting gate of the 
litigation” is not dispositive.  
 
 In sum, aside from the lack of discovery, this case 
bears little resemblance to the cases in which we have found 
no waiver, and shares substantial similarity to the cases in 
which waiver was found.  Plaintiffs made a showing on five 
of the six Hoxworth factors, and most notably demonstrated a 
delay approaching one year during which AdvancePCS 
aggressively sought a resolution on the merits.  Ehleiter, 482 
F.3d at 223 (finding waiver where the defendant “require[ed 
plaintiff] to defend his claims on the merits and invit[ed] final 
resolution of the case in a judicial forum”).  AdvancePCS’s 
motions were not based solely on the pleadings, but were 
supported with substantial materials and facts outside the 
scope of the pleadings.  We cannot ignore the time, expense, 
and legal fees Plaintiffs invested in defending their claims 
against these multiple attacks.  Gray Holdco, 654 F.3d at 458-
59 (“[W]e cannot ignore the legal expenses Cassady incurred 
while Gray sat on its arbitration rights”). This prejudice to 
Plaintiffs is illustrated by the fact that they chose to dismiss 
their complaint rather than arbitrate.  If AdvancePCS had 
moved to compel arbitration immediately after the filing of 
the complaint, Plaintiffs would have been spared the time and 
expense of litigating for the next ten months because they 
would not have proceeded in arbitration and never would 
have had to face AdvancePCS’s various motions, including its 
comprehensive motion to dismiss.     
 
 Judge Robreno issued the order compelling arbitration 
almost eight years ago, and did not have the benefit of our 
more recent decisions on waiver, such as Gray Holdco and 
Nino.  Nevertheless, he put undue emphasis on the lack of 
discovery and did not conduct a proper “totality of the 
circumstances” analysis and weighing of the six Hoxworth 
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factors.  The end result, as we stated in Nino, was that he 
“gave insufficient consideration . . . to the more practical 
question of whether [defendant] has acted inconsistently with 
the right to arbitrate.”  Nino, 609 F.3d at 209 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  A party such as AdvancePCS 
“should not be allowed to delay its demand for arbitration and 
use federal court proceedings to test the water before taking a 
swim,” especially where the only explanation for the change 
in strategy from litigation to arbitration is that AdvancePCS 
“substituted attorneys.”  Gray Holdco, 654 F.3d at 453, 461 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  We acknowledge that 
“any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues,” 
including waiver, “should be resolved in favor of arbitration,” 
id. at 451.  Given the extent of AdvancePCS’s litigation in 
federal court, however, and the fact that our review is de 
novo,3
 
 we do not doubt that the order compelling arbitration 
should be reversed.   
IV.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
AdvancePCS waived its right to arbitrate, and we thus will 
                                                 
3 AdvancePCS seems to contend that the conclusion that 
Plaintiffs had suffered no prejudice is a factual finding that 
should be reviewed under the clear error standard.  
(Appellee’s Br. at 24.)  While a district court’s factual 
findings on any one of the individual Hoxworth factors are 
reviewed for clear error, the question of whether the factors in 
the aggregate amount to prejudice (and therefore waiver) is 
properly reviewed de novo.  Gray Holdco, 654 F.3d at 451 
(“We exercise plenary review over . . . [the question of] 
whether a party ‘through its litigation conduct, waived its 
right to compel arbitration,’” quoting Nino, 609 F.3d at 200 
(reversing a district court’s finding of no waiver without 
mentioning that the court clearly erred); Kawasaki Heavy 
Indus., Ltd. v. Bombardier Recreational Prods., Inc., 660 F.3d 
988, 994 (7th Cir. 2011) (“While the factual findings that led 
to the district court’s conclusion of waiver are reviewed for 
clear error, the question of whether [a party’s] conduct 
amounts to waiver is reviewed de novo.”).  
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reverse the order of the District Court compelling arbitration.     
 
 
 
 
 
